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Abstract
	 The	purpose	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	study	 for	how	corporate	governance	 in	Japanese	
firms	has	developed	more	effective	for	M&A.	Mandatory	disclosure	related	to	corporate	
governance	have	rapidly	 improved	and	established.	However,	 the	sensational	case	of	
Olympus	 for	accounting	 fraud	makes	us	 to	 remember	 that	 Japanese	 firms	have	 the	
weakness	of	corporate	governance	and	audit	as	well	as	various	disgraceful	affairs	in	the	
past.	Actually,	overseas	 investors	have	 thought	 that	 financial	 statements	of	Japanese	
firms	without	reliability	since	several	frauds	since	1990,	which	resulted	in	the	problem	
of	Legend Clause.	Recently,	several	global	M&A	of	Japanese	companies	are	presented	
lively	in	foreign	countries,	but	such	M&A	are	abused	by	concealment	of	loss	for	many	
years	of	Olympus.	The	growing	discussions	about	higher	corporate	governance	made	
global	markets	to	develop	with	the	transparency	of	their	accounting	information.	Thus,	
it	 is	necessary	 for	 Japanese	 firms	 to	enrich	 the	 financial	 information	 for	 corporate	
governance.	We	need	 to	consider	 several	of	historical	 cases	 in	 Japan	such	as	Sotoh	
and	Yushiro	that	 indicate	the	change	of	their	positive	disclosure	to	effective	corporate	
governance	after	TOB	attack.	
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Ⅰ  Introduction
	 Recently,	most	global	firms	including	Japanese	firms	understand	the	threat	of	M&A	
that	 they	might	be	 faced	on	 that	 in	near	 future.	According	 to	 the	survey＊1	 in	2011,	
the	93.3%	of	Japanese	listing	companies	answer	for	the	positive	opinion	forward	M&A,	
because	of	the	strength	of	Yen	and	the	shortage	of	electricity.	Actually,	 in	2011,	there	
are	609	cases	which	Japanese	companies	purchased	overseas	companies	and	the	ratio	
gets	higher	to	78%	than	last	year.	The	total	price	of	purchase	is	68.4	billion	dollars＊2.	
＊1　	This	survey	announced	in	September	7,	2011	by	Nihon	M&A	Center	Inc.	is	for	M&A	of	
the	listed	company	in	Japan.
＊2　Nikkei	Shimbun,	December	29,	2011.　
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	 Investors	 in	 Japanese	 firms	 are	 sensitive	 to	 the	manager’s	 response	 to	 the	
effectiveness	of	corporate	governance,	particularly	in	their	accountability.	The	increase	
of	M&As	by	 takeover	bid	“hostile	TOB,”	makes	most	managers	 to	 face	 a	 critical	
problem	on	management.	Mandatory	disclosure	 for	corporate	governance	has	rapidly	
developed.	The	First	Subcommittee	of	the	Financial	System	Council,	an	important	third-
party	advisory	council	 to	 the	Financial	Services	Agency	 (FSA)	stated	 in	 the	Report,	
December	16,	2002,	that	we	need	more	information	to	strengthen	corporate	governance.	
This	report	was	one	of	 the	reforms	to	 improve	security	market	 through	the	cases	of	
window	dressing	by	U.S.	firms	in	2003.	
	 Furthermore,	 based	 on	 the	 report,	 FSA	 announced＊3	Measures for Ensuring 
Confidence in the Disclosure System	 on	November	 16,	 2004;	 (1)	 Introduction	 of	
the	 following	 requirements	 regarding	 internal	 control	 over	 financial	 reporting:	 an	
assessment	by	management	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 internal	 control	 over	 financial	
reporting,	and	auditing	by	CPA	or	audit	firm	of	the	above	assessment	by	management,	
(2)	 Introduction	of	an	administrative	civil	money	penalty	system	against	breaches	of	
the	continuous	disclosure	requirements,	 (3)	Enhancement	of	disclosure	of	governance-
related	 information	and	 (4)	Enhancement	of	disclosure	about	a	parent	company	by	a	
public	subsidiary,	 in	cases	where	the	parent	company	is	not	under	the	continuous	and	
disclosure	requirements.	FSA	revised	the	regulations＊4	for	securities	report	from	March	
2005	 in	order	to	 (a)	enhance	disclosure	related	to	corporate	governance	and	to	 (b)	put	
into	effect	disclosure	of	parent	company	 information	 in	subsidiary	companies’	financial	
reports	 in	cases	 in	which	the	parent	company	 is	not	under	 the	continuous	disclosure	
requirement.	This	paper	mainly	deals	with	the	above	(3)	and	(a).	
	 However,	the	case	of	Olympus	for	accounting	fraud	gave	us	a	sensational	example	in	
the	world	which	the	 function	of	corporate	governance	and	audit	 in	Japanese	company	
are	not	always	effective.	Several	global	M&A	by	Japanese	companies	are	presented	
lively	in	foreign	countries,	but	such	M&A	are	abused	by	concealment	of	loss	for	many	
years	of	Olympus.	Hatta	et	al	 (2011)	explains	 that	 it	has	historically	been	considered	
to	be	a	 serious	problem	 that	 Japanese	companies	have	 sometimes	 the	weakness	of	
governance	and	audit	and	various	disgraceful	affairs.	Actually,	overseas	investors	have	
thought	 that	 financial	 statements	of	 Japanese	 firms	without	 reliability	 since	several	
＊3　	‘Further	Measures	 for	Ensuring	Confidence	 in	 the	Disclosure	System,’ Press Release,	
December	24,	2004,	FSA	(http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newse.html).
＊4　	‘Work	Schedule	 for	the	Implementation	of	 the	Program	for	Further	Financial	Reform,’	
Press Release,	March	29,	2005,	FSA	(http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newse/e20050329.pdf).
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frauds	 since	 1990,	which	 resulted	 in	 the	problem	of	Legend Clause.	The	growing	
discussions	about	higher	corporate	governance	made	global	markets	to	develop	with	the	
transparency	of	their	accounting	information.	
	 The	 survey＊5	 on	 Listed	 Companies’	 Corporate	 Governance	 by	Tokyo	 Stock	
Exchange,	 Inc.	 (TSE)	was	announced	on	November	30,	2000	and	returned	by	1310	of	
1994	companies,	more	than	97%	firms	answered	that	they	were	interested	in	corporate	
governance.	And	it	pointed	out	the	actual	conduct	of	their	management,	more	than	88%	
of	the	companies,	which	was	almost	the	same	level	compared	with	last	time,	answered	
they	were	paying	attention	 to	 recent	discussions	on	corporate	governance	 to	 some	
extent.	The	2003	survey	shows	that	75.3%	of	 the	companies	answered	the	extensive	
disclosure	and	accountability	for	investors	to	enhance	corporate	governance	(TSE	2003).
	 Now,	we	have	 to	 study	 for	good	experiences	 in	 the	past	 for	 Japanese	 firms	 to	
conscious	 the	 significance	 of	 disclosure,	which	makes	 corporate	governance	more	
effective.	Therefore,	this	paper	consider	that	the	three	Japanese	firms	which	have	been	
faced	on	hostile	TOB:	Sotoh	Co.,	LTD.	 (Sotoh),	Yushiro	Chemical	 Industry	Co.,	Ltd.	
(Yushiro)	and	Nippon	Broadcasting	Network,	 Incorporated	 (Nippon	Broadcasting)	have	
achieved	higher	corporate	governance	by	improving	their	financial	information.	
Ⅱ  Nature of Corporate Governance
What is the Corporate Governance?
	 Definitions	of	corporate	governance	are	so	various	 that	 it	cannot	be	standardized	
globally.	
	 Organization	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	(OECD)	states	the	OECD	
principles	of	Corporate	Governance＊6	which	have	been	developed	as	 the	 international	
benchmark	since	the	endorsement	in	1999	and	the	revision	in	2004	by	OECD	ministers.	
OECD	 (2004,	p.	 4)	 explains	about	 the	 reason	of	 the	 revision,	 as	 the	principles are	a	
living	instrument	offering	non-binding	standards	and	good	practices	as	well	as	guidance	
on	 implementation,	which	can	be	adapted	 to	 the	specific	circumstances	of	 individual	
countries	and	regions.	That	revised	principles	show	that	there	is	no	single	model	of	good	
corporate	governance	(OECD	2004,	p.	13).	Yanaga	(2004,	p.	75)	also	points	out	the	variety	
＊5　	Refer	to	the	TSE	website	(http://www.tse.or.jp/english/news/2001/200102/010221_a.html).
＊6　	You	 can	 download	 the	 document	 by	 various	 languages	 such	 as	French,	 German,	
Japanese,	 etc.	 on	 the	 following	website	 (http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,2340,
en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_1,00.html).
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of	 the	definition	of	corporate	governance.	For	example,	of	other	previous	researches,	
Wakasugi	(2001,	p.	194)	regards	it	as	the	system	to	supervise	managers	for	stockholders.	
Osano	(2001,	p.	1)	mentions	that	the	purpose	is	to	make	them	well	disciplined	to	secure	
shareholder’s	income.	It	is	called	as	“kigyo-touchi”	in	Japanese	that	means	‘to	govern	a	
company’.	
The relationship between corporate governance and Disclosure	
	 Because	the	measure	to	evaluate	the	corporate	value	 is	stock	price	 in	general,	 the	
effectiveness	of	corporate	governance	needs	positive	disclosure.	Disclosure	 is	classified	
into	 two	 types:	mandatory	systems	and	voluntary	systems.	The	 former	depends	on	
some	regulations	like	accounting	standards,	audit	standards,	and	corporate	law	etc,	while	
the	 latter	 is	a	part	of	public	relations.	Corporate	governance	has	‘direct’	 relationship	
with	 the	mandatory	disclosure	as	a	means	of	announcement	of	corporate	earnings	 to	
related	party.	‘Direct’	relationship	is	a	kind	of	correlation	that	one	affects	the	other.	In	
short,	effective	corporate	governance	is	influenced	by	whether	the	mandatory	disclosure	
system	is	enough	and	appropriate	for	users.
Ⅲ  Hostile TOB in Japan
Background and Impact of Hostile TOB
	 Japanese	managers	are	in	whirlpool	that	is	requested	the	effectiveness	of	corporate	
governance.	Over	recent	years,	they	feel	such	a	threat	that	they	have	never	experienced	
by	some	hostile	TOB.	Threat is	an	anxiety	that	their	firms	might	be	faced	on	the	TOB	
in	 the	near	 future.	However,	 some	cases	 for	hostile	TOB	have	already	been	shown	
before	10	years.	Then,	why	are	 they	concerned	 in	 recent	years?	 	According	 to	 the	
report	by	Economic	and	Social	Research	 Institute	 (ESRI) ＊7,	ESRI	 (2004)	 showed	 the	
＊ 7　	The	Economic	and	Social	Research	Institute	(ESRI)	was	founded	in	January	2001	as	part	
of	the	Cabinet	Office	with	the	expansion	of	the	functions	and	scale	of	the	Economic	Plan-
ning	Agency’s	Economic	Research	Institute	under	the	reorganization	of	Japan’s	central	
government	ministries	and	agencies.	Known	as	the	“forum	for	knowledge”	for	the	Cabinet,	
the	Cabinet	Office	 is	 in	charge	of	key	administrative	 issues	 (Prefer	 to	http://www.esri.
go.jp/en/esri/menu-e.html).	ESRI	have	studied	M&A	issues	and	improve	the	investment	
system	by	M&A	in	the	Study	Group	for	M&A	established	on	December	11,	2003.	Go	into	
the	website	(http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/mer/kenkyukai/031211-01.html).	The	Cabinet	Office	
was	not	only	established	to	strengthen	the	 functioning	of	 the	Cabinet,	but	also	created	
with	Prime	Minister	as	its	head	for	the	sake	of	key	issues	in	the	reform	by	central	gov-
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following	points	as	the	background:	 (1)	non-transparency	of	accounting	and	governance	
systems	and	 (2)	overvalued	stock	price,	and	 (3)	unattractive	business	or	companies	 for	
investment.	First,	it	points	that	accounting	and	corporate	governance	systems	in	Japan	
have	been	more	transparent	than	those	 in	the	beginning	of	1990.	 Indeed,	after	several	
window	dressing	or	 frauds	by	 Japanese	Firms,	 various	 accounting	 standards	have	
already	prepared	or	revised	and	the	settled	organization	have	transferred	public	sector,	
BADC	 into	private	sector,	Accounting	Standard	Board,	Japan	 (ASBJ).	Corporate	Law	
have	been	revised	some	articles	concerned	about	corporate	governance,	 involving	the	
number	of	auditors	and	the	establishment	of	company	with	committees.	
	 The	second	point,	overvalued	stock	price	brings	about	cross-shareholdings,	 that	 is	
one	of	traditional	management	style	in	Japan,	but	the	style	has	got	old-fashioned.	Many	
companies	have	unwound	their	shareholders	yet	after	the	collapse	of	Bubble	economy,	
because	they	could	not	stand	up	to	the	write-off	many	cross-shareholder stocks	with	the	
fair-value	accounting	 for	securities.	Third,	business	and	company	that	have	damaged	
by	the	 long	recession	are	undervalued.	Table	1	 illustrates	 the	more	attractiveness	of	
Japanese	firms	for	overseas	investors	by	shareownership	of	foreigners.	
ernment	ministries	and	agencies	intended	to	create	a	new	system	of	governance	for	the	
21st	century.	See	to	the	web	(http://www.cao.go.jp/about-cao/pmf2004/3-4.pdf).	
Table1  Shareownership in listing companies in Japan
Source:		Tokyo	Stock	Exchange	Inc.	2011.	Fact Book 2011,	p.84.
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	 The	ratio	of	 foreigners	 in	Mar.	2004	has	been	21.8%,	about	 two	 times	as	high	as	
in	Mar.	 1996.	 Iemori	 (1998)	verifies	 that	 the	correlation	between	 this	 ratio	 and	 the	
assessment	of	governance	system	is	positive,	that	is,	the	better	the	market	assessment	
of	governance	system	is,	 the	higher	the	shareownership	of	 foreigners	 is.	Anyway,	 the	
three	points	would	be	some	factors	to	increase	hostile	TOB	in	these	days.	
Defense Measures: Legal and Corporate Governance System
 			The	Defense	Measures	against	hostile	attacks	are	divided	into	two	factors	by	inside	
and	outside	points	where	the	responsibility	lies:	 (1)	Improvement	of	effective	corporate	
governance	and	 (2)	Preparation	of	 regulations.	 Improvement	of	 effective	 corporate	
governance	depends	on	individual	responsibility	of	each	firm	and	manager,	that	can	be	
defined	as	the	inside	factor.	Managers	are	usually	charged	to	go	up	corporate	value	and	
manage	 for	shareholders.	The	 improvement	means	the	sustainable	growth	of	earnings	
as	well	as	 the	stability	of	high	stock	prices.	And	then,	several	regulations	 for	hostile	
TOB	are	on	board.	Ministry	of	Economy,	Trade,	and	Industry	(METI)	has	organized	a	
study	group	for	corporate	value	for	the	purpose	to	prepare	the	countering	methods	for	
hostile	TOB	on	September	16,	2004	and	summarized	the	main	points	on	March	2005＊8.	It	
is	also	scheduled	to	complete	those	drafts	in	cooperation	with	the	Ministry	of	Justice	on	
May	2005.	As	mentioned	above,	the	study	group	for	M&A,	ESRI	has	already	suggested	
that	 in	Japan,	both	 the	defense	measures	 laws	 for	business	and	 taxation	have	 to	be	
prepared	in	that	proposal	that	has	already	reported	on	September	16,	2004.	These	inside	
and	outside	activities	surrounded	hostile	TOB	would	become	more	and	more	active,	
especially	after	they	know	a	new	case	of	hostile	TOB.	
Ⅳ  Case Studies
Summary of three hostile TOB 
	 This	paper	has	surveyed	some	previous	researches	of	corporate	governance	and	the	
background	of	discussing	the	hostile	TOB	that	 threatens	 for	firms	and	managers	and	
makes	governance	system	ineffective,	including	the	reasons	why	it	has	been	focused	in	
recent	Japan.	It	can	be	mainly	explained	by	various	reports	or	researches	by	scholars	or	
government	and	the	concerned	ministries.	In	next	section	of	this	paper,	I	would	examine	
the	change	of	their	disclosure	for	effective	corporate	governance	through	case	studies	of	
＊8　	Refer	 to	 the	METI	website	 for	 this	 information	of	 the	study	group	 (http://www.meti.
go.jp/committee/index.html).
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three	companies,	Sotoh,	Yushiro	and	Nippon	Broadcasting.	It	also	considers	the	reason	
why	they	had	to	face	the	hostile	TOB.	
Cases of Sotoh and Yushiro
 Sotoh	is	one	of	the	chemical	companies	for	staining	of	woolen	textile.	Those	activities	
for	 hostile	TOB	over	 Sotoh	have	 started	 on	 the	 great	 investment	 by	SPJ,	 a	U.S.	
investment	 firms,	 in	October	2002.	Sotoh’s	executives	have	announced	the	MBO	plan	
in	collaborations	with	a	venture	capital,	NIF	Ventures	after	a	week	when	SPJ	had	first	
accepted	the	TOB,	December	19,	2003.	Because	they	could	not	get	ahead	of	the	second	
TOB	price	showed	by	 the	 fund,	 they	has	declared	 to	 increase	 the	dividend	 for	 two	
years	running,	the	annual	year,	Mar.	2004	to	Mar.	2006,	concurrently	the	withdrawal	of	
MBO.	The	plan	(Table	2)	settled	the	dividend	per	share	into	200	yen	in	Mar.	2004	and	
promised	 the	 total	would	be	500	yen	 in	next	 two	years,	which	defended	against	 the	
hostile	TOB.	
	 Yushiro,	a	chemical	firm	that	in	the	field	of	metalworking	oils	and	fluids,	is	recognized	
Table 2 Sotoh’s Cash Dividends before and after the TOB 
（Yen）	
Interim	Dividends	Per	Share Annual	Dividends	Per	Share
Interim	results,	September	2003 			6.50 −
Interim	results,	September	2004 75.00 −
Fiscal results, May 2004 − 200.00
Source:	Sotoh’s	information	in	Separate	Interium	Statements	of	the	fiscal	year	ending	March	31,	2005.
Note:	75.00	yen	per	share	including	68.50	yen	per	stock	as	special	dividends.
Table 3 Yushiro’s Amanded Dividends (Expected) after the TOB 
	
Original	Plan May-04 May-05 May-06 May-07
Net	Income	(Million	Yen) 700 800 900 1,000
Cash	Dividends	(Million	Yen) 2,960 740 ～ 770 840 ～ 870 940 ～ 970
Cash	Dividends	per	Share	(Yen) 200 50 ～ 55 55 ～ 60 60 ～ 65
Amanded	Plan May-04(results) May-05 May-06 May-07
Net	Income	(Million	Yen) 830 900 950 1,000
Cash	Dividends	(Million	Yen) 2,960 840 ～ 870 880 ～ 920 940 ～ 970
Cash	Dividends	per	Share	(Yen) 200 50 ～ 60 57 ～ 62 60 ～ 65
Source:		The	14	 th	Yushiro’s	management	plan	 revised	 in	December	3,	 2004	 (http://www.yushiro.co.jp/ir/
pdf/14ji%20keikaku%20syuusei.pdf).
Note:	The	amanded	amounts	are	underlined	(ex.	2,960).
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and	well-respected	 in	building	maintenance	products	 and	 textile	 auxiliaries＊9.	The	
Company	announced	that	it	would	pay	200	yen	per	stock	as	the	annual	dividends	in	May	
2004	and	the	payout	ratio	would	be	100%	for	next	three	years	since	May	2005	(Table	3),	
as	soon	as	SPJ	had	accepted	TOB	into	the	company	in	December	2003	like	the	case	of	
Sotoh.	After	the	TOB,	Yushiro’s	executives	have	changed	the	management	strategies	to	
make	a	positive	use	of	the	holding	fund	without	pooling.
	 These	two	Companies	have	been	accepted	TOB	by	SPJ	at	the	same	time.	As	one	of	
factors,	I	could	consider	that	SPJ	felt	their	market	value	before	TOB	was	good	bargain	
in	comparison	with	those	book	values,	and	you	can	see	them	by	Table	4.	For	example,	
both	of	market	values	based	on	the	stock	price	in	the	fiscal	year	ending	Mar.	31,	2003,	
are	almost	half	of	the	book	values,	44.3%	and	53.9%,	respectively	shown	by	rate	of	book	
value.	
Case of Nippon Broadcasting
	 Fuji Television Network, Inc. and Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. today signed 
a basic agreement that will result in Nippon Broadcasting becoming a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Fuji Television. 
	 This	 is	 the	 first	 sentence	 in	 the	notification＊10	 announced	by	 the	Broadcasting	
Company	on	April	18,	2005.	Nippon	Broadcasting	 is	a	broadcasting	company,	mainly	
as	the	means	by	radio.	The	entrance	by	Internet	Portal	Livedoor	Co.,	LTD.	 (Livedoor)	
started	 the	TOB	battle	between	 the	media	 firm	and	Fuji	TV	 for	 shares	of	Nippon	
Broadcasting.	 In	February	4	and	7,	2005,	Livedoor	acquired	the	exceed	5%	of	Nippon	
＊9　Refer	to	the	Yushiro	website	(http://www.yushiro.co.jp/english/products/index.html).　
＊10		This	notification	is	disclosed	on	the	website	(http://www.jolf.co.jp/company/IR1242/index.
html)	in	May	1,	2005.
Table 4 Sotoh’s and Yushiro’s Value in 2003 
	
Sotoh Yushiro
Million	Yen
Rate	of
Book	Value
Stock	Price
on	the	day
Million	Yen
Rate	of
Book	Value
Stock	Price
on	the	day
Market	Value（Mar.	31） 10,673 44.3 Mar.	24 10,432 53.9 Mar.	31
Market	Value（the	day	of	TOB) 17,107 71.1 Dec.	24 15,512 80.2 Dec.	12
Book	Value（Mar.	31) 24,075 − Mar.	31 19,353 − Mar.	31
Source:		Sotoh’s	and	Yushiro’s	preliminary	release	of	financial	results	in	the	fiscal	year	ending	March	31,	2003.
Note:	Based	on	the	mean	of	share	numbers	in	March	31,	2003	and	stock	prices	on	each	specified	day.
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Broadcasting’s	stocks	by	TOB,	and	the	numbers	of	stocks	are	1,756,760,	5.36%	as	of	Feb.	
7.	Then,	purchase	price	was	5,950	yen	per	share,	while	the	stock	price	went	up	to	1,990	
yen	after	the	news ＊11.	Table	5	illustrates	a	series	of	the	TOB	activities.	
	 The	70-day-long	disturbance	ended	 in	the	agreement	of	 the	two	firms	that	the	TV	
Company	will	not	only	purchase	all	 the	shares	of	Nippon	Broadcasting	that	Livedoor	
took	during	 its	hostile	TOB	but	also	acquire	a	stake	 in	the	Web	portal	operator	 itself.	
They	are	also	going	to	talk	on	a	tie-up.	Ultimately,	Livedoor	could	get	about	150	billion	
yen	 from	100	billion	yen	of	 the	principal	 investment.	Morewhile,	Fuji	has	been	 faced	
on	the	 two	kinds	of	risk	 that	 invests	 in	 the	Net	and	gives	 the	negative	effect	 for	 its	
shareholders.	Fuji	TV	and	Nippon	Broadcasting	showed	the	following	considerations	to	
their	stockholder:	
(1)	The interests of minority shareholders of Nippon Broadcasting System 
(2)	The rapid execution of an exchange of stock between Fuji Television and Nippon 
＊ 11	Nihon	Keizai	Shimbun,	February	8,	2005.
Table 5 Activities for Nippon Broadcasting-TOB in 2005 
	
Date Contents
Jan.	17 Fuji	TV	announced	TOB	of	Nippon	Broadcasting	shares.
Feb.	8 Livedoor	announced	TOB	of	Nippon	Broadcasting	shares	and	acquired	35%	of	all	the	shares.
Feb.	10 Fuji	TV	decreased	the	target	shares	from	exceed	50%	to	25%.
Feb.	23 Nippon	Broadcasting	decided	to	issue	the	great	numbers	of	warrant	bonds
Feb.	24 Livedoor	Fuji	claimed	the	enjoinment	of	the	issue	to	the	court.
March.	8 Fuji	TV	stated	to	success	TOB,	acquiring	the	36.47%	of	Nippon	Broadcasting	shares.
March.	11 The	Tokyo	Court	admitted	Livedoor’s	plea.
March	15 Fuji	TV	decided	to	increase	payout	for	shareholders	of	Nippon	Broadcasting.
March	16 Livedoor	purchased	exceed	50%	(based	on	voting	right)	of	Nippon	Broadcasitng.
The	Tokyo	Court	dismissed	an	objection	by	Nippon	Broadcasitng.
March	22 Fuji	TV	decided	to	increase	payout	for	shareholders	of	Nippon	Broadcasting	that	is	enough	50	
billions.
March	23 Livedoor	purchased	exceed	50%	(based	on	voting	right)	of	Nippon	Broadcasitng.
The	Tokyo	High	Court	dismissed	again	the	objection	by	Nippon	Broadcasitng.
March	24 Nippon	Broadcasting	announced	to	lent	the	13.88	%	shares	for	Soft	Investment	Co.
April	18 Nippon	Broadcasting	 and	Fuji	TV	 signed	 a	 basic	 agreement	 that	will	 result	 in	Nippon	
Broadcasting	becoming	a	wholly	owned	subsidiary	of	Fuji	Television.
Livedoor	 and	Fuji	TV	 signed	 an	 agreement	 that	Livedoor	 sell	 all	 the	 shares	 of	Nippon	
Broadcasting	for	Fuji	TV.
May	10 Livedoor	and	Fuji	TV	launched	executive-talks	for	the	details	of	business	aliancess.
Source:		Nihon	Keizai	Shimbun,	March	26,	2005;	Japan	Times,	May	11,	2005.
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Broadcasting System in order to capture synergies quickly across the businesses 
of the two companies. To prevent dilution of the value of shares held by current 
Fuji Television shareholders, Fuji Television will restrict the issuance of new 
shares.
Refer to Nippon Broadcasting’s News Release, “Notification of Basic Agreement 
Making Nippon Broadcasting Systems a wholly Owned Subsidiary,” April 
18, 2005.
The	wholly	owned	action	will	be	done	on	September	1,	2005	through	the	stock	exchange	
under	the	Industrial	Revitalization	Law.	
Disclosure Development for Effective Corporate Governance
	 This	 paper	 studies	 the	 disclosure	 for	 effective	 corporate	 governance	 in	 the	
preliminary	release	of	financial	results	in	the	three	cases	of	Sotoh,	Yushiro	and	Nippon	
Broadcasting.	It	is	examined	how	they	changed	the	disclosure	information	for	corporate	
Table 6 Sotoh’s Disclosure Information in 2004 
	
(1)	Enhancement of Capital Efficiency
Management	Policy
	Targeting	managemet	measure:	Sotoh	Group	makes	effort	for	the	enhancement of capital efficiency,	profitability	
and	 corporate	 value,	 targeting	 5%	 exceed	 return	 on	 equity	 as	 a	
management	measure.
Operating	Result	and	Financial	Position
	Perspective	 for	 the	next	year:	 Sotoh	Group	 think	 that	 it	 is	 basically	 important	 for	 the	high	quality	 of	
management	 on	 condition	 that	 looks	 at	 such	 a	 difficult	 situation	 and	
discriminate	against	cheaper	imports.	We	will	improve	operations	activities	
positively,	developing	attractive	processing	techiniques	as	well	as	a	exert	
ourselves	 to	 cut	 total	 costs,	 improve	 the	 competitivness	 of	 business,	
and	 furthermore	reform	over	enhancement of capital efficiency	and	over	
management.
(2)	Methods of Dividend Yield
Management	Policy
	Basic	policy	of	dividend	yield:		We	consider	that	our	retained	earnings	are	at	the	level	that	can	be	fit	for	more	
aggressive	 competitiveness	 and	 larger	 investments	 of	 equipment	 and	
development	 for	cost-down	or	market	needs.	Thus,	we	decided	 to	pay	
dividend	from	the	retained	earnings	within	the	limit	that	may	not	prevent	
the	activities	of	core	business.	Thus,	we	think	that	cash	dividends	will	be	
done	without	interfering	with	our	core	business,	and	methods of dividend 
yield	are	going	to	be	the	total	of	500	yen	per	share	not	later	than	Mar.	31,	
2006,	of	which	is	200	yen	per	share	in	the	current	year.
Source:		Sotoh’s	preliminary	release	of	financial	results	of	the	fiscal	year	ending	May	20,	2004.
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governance	 in	those	documents,	comparing	the	release	ended	 in	the	fiscal	year	before	
and	after	each	TOB.	Those	results	are	shown	as	the	following	Table	6-7.
	 In	 the	 Sotoh’s	 release	 after	 the	 announcement	 of	TOB,	more	 information	 for	
‘enhancement	of	 capital	 efficiency’	and	‘methods	of	dividend	yield’	has	newly	been	
added.	That	 shows	 the	executives	 transferred	holding	earnings	 into	paying	positive	
dividends	 as	 their	management	 policy.	 In	 the	mean	 time,	Yushiro	 fulfilled	more	
information	 about	 positive correspondence of investor relations	 (IR)	 and	values,	 the	
concerned	word	with	corporate	governance.	Especially,	the	values	in	this	document	are	
mentioned	in	9	parts	such	as	corporate	value,	shareholder	value,	and	stock	value.	Such	
information	expresses	the	manager’s	policy	to	strengthen	operations	 for	shareholders.	
Then,	Yushiro	announced	the	14th	three-year-plan	which	has	five	important	policies.	One	
of	the	policies	is	‘strengthening	of	corporate	governance,’	composed	with	two	measures	
including	value:	The	enforcement	of	profit	distribution	policy	 to	 increase	 shareholder 
value	(100%	payout)	and	the	timely	disclosure	(positive	activities	for	investor	relations).	
	 How	about	Nippon	Broadcasting?		There	are	no	words	about	corporate	governance	
in	 the	preliminary	results	as	of	May	26,	2004,	 though	TSE	requested	 the	qualitative	
information	about	corporate	governance	since	2001.	However,	 in	the	interim	release	as	
of	November	24,	2004	immediately	before	the	series	of	TOB	problems,	the	ten-word	of	
corporate governance	were	described.	Nippon	Broadcasting	emphasized	on	the	measure	
of	effective	corporate	governance	as	followed:
Table 7 Yushiro’s Value Information 
	
Value (Corporate, Shareholder, Stock)
Management	Policy
	Corporate	governance:	…In	 the	 future,	we	will	 enforce	 the	positive	dividends	and	correspond	of	 investor	
relations	(IR)	for	the	higher	corporate value	and	secure	the	transparency	of	
our	financial	statements
	Basic	policy	of	dividend	yield:	Our	company	considers	that	the	stockholder's	equity	has	been	already	reaced	
the	apropriate	 level	on	 the	 future	 investment	 for	medium	or	 long	 term	
business,	 resulting	 in	our	efforts	 to	hold	earnings	 to	enhance	 the	stable	
dividend	and	corporate	system.	We	are	confident	of	much	stock value	than	
the	equity,	though	in	stock	market,	the	value	is	now	reflected	on	our	stock	
price.
	Management	plan	 for	medium	or	 long	 term:	The	 enforcement	 of	 profit	 distribution	policy	 to	 increase	
shareholder value	 (100%	payout)	The	timely	disclosure	 (Positive	activities	
for	investor	relations)
Source:	Yushiro’s	preliminary	release	as	of	May	17,	2004.
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	 	The state of enforcement in this recent year for enhancement of our corporate 
governance
	 We make effort to study for the enhancement of our corporate governance. To 
make the strengthening of corporate governance and the improvement of corporate 
value be effective, our company appointed three outside directors as new members 
to the board in the annual meeting, June 2004. 
	 Refer to the Nippon Broadcasting’s interim preliminary release as of Nov. 24, 
2004.
	 However,	I	could	not	examine	the	change	of	the	information	concerned	about	corporate	
governance	in	the	2005	release	ended	March	31,	 if	 it	 is	announced	in	May	every	year,	
because	I	consider	that	it	is	effective	to	understand	how	TOB	affects	opinions	and	views	
of	the	offered	companies	and	managers	for	corporate	governance,	and	it	would	be	done	
soon.
Ⅴ  Conclusion 
			This	paper	considered	again	by	indicating	three	cases	that	the	disclosure	information	
is	deeply	related	to	effective	corporate	governance.	Exclusively,	the	preliminary	release	
of	financial	results	as	a	mandatory	system	is	the	first	announcement	for	investors	after	
the	closing	day	at	the	end	of	the	fiscal	year.	Therefore,	it	is	natural	that	the	information	
disclosed	on	 the	 release	 is	valuable	 for	 them.	However,	 the	definition	of	 corporate	
governance	 is	not	collective,	but	various,	 as	OECD	 (2004)	and	Yanaga	 (2004)	 stated,	
for	example,	 of	 several	previous	 researches,	 corporate	governance	 is	 regarded	as	a	
system	to	supervise	managers	for	stockholders	(Wakasugi	2001)	and	to	make	them	well	
disciplined	 to	secure	shareholder’s	 income	 (Osano	2001).	 It	 is	also	generally	called	 in	
Japan	as	“kigyo-touchi”	that	means	‘to	govern	a	company’.	
	 Considering	 these	definitions,	 I	 can	consider	 that	 the	effectiveness	 of	 corporate	
governance	depends	on	whether	firms	or	executives	could	recognize	their	management	
should	turn	to	stockholders	who	make	decisions	to	 invest	their	shares	by	the	financial	
information	including	the	preliminary	release.	In	other	words,	the	preliminary	release	is	
positioned	as	one	of	the	means	for	effective	corporate	governance.
	 	 	 In	 this	study,	 it	 is	 shown	that	Sotoh’s	and	Yushiro	have	changed	 their	policies	 to	
disclose	 for	 corporate	governance	 after	TOB.	Actually,	 they	have	prepared	more	
information	 related	 to	 corporate	governance	as	well	 as	 announced	 to	 increase	 the	
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dividends	 for	 several	years.	Sotoh	added	 information	about	‘enhancement	of	capital	
efficiency’	and	‘methods	of	dividend	yield’	 to	show	their	management	policy	that	pay	
positive	dividends	 for	 current	 and	potential	 shareholders.	Yushiro	 discloses	more	
information	about	positive correspondence of investor relations	(IR)	and	values	concerned	
about	corporate	governance.	As	shown	by	the	values	in	9	parts,	the	policy	is	shown	to	
strengthen	operations	for	shareholders.	On	the	other	hand,	Nippon	Broadcasting	changed	
the	opinions	 for	disclosure.	The	company’s	 information	about	corporate	governance	 in	
the	interim	release	as	of	Nov.	2004	was	announced,	though	there	was	no	information	as	
of	Mar.	2004.	
	 This	paper	does	not	study	the	Broadcasting	Company’s	release	at	 the	year	ended	
after	TOB	yet,	because	it	has	not	been	made	public	yet,	however	it	would	be	done	soon.	
Three	cases	give	a	chance	for	Japanese	firms	to	recognize	the	significance	of	reliability	
in	financial	statements	toward	effective	corporate	governance	to	prepare	M&A	attacks.
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